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PAVING THE ROAD:* A CHARLES HAMILTON
HOUSTON APPROACH TO SECURING TRANS RIGHTS
JENNIFER L. LEVI**
I. INTRODUCTION 1
Securing the rights of transgender people2 requires a
comprehensive and long-term litigation strategy. As other
commentators3 have explained, most courts that have addressed
discrimination claims brought by transgender people have
excluded us from the legal protections of the laws. 4  The
* The title of this Article derives from the incisive documentary, THE ROAD TO
BROWN, (California Newsreel 1989), which details the life and work of Charles Hamilton
Houston.
** Jennifer Levi is a Staff Attorney at Gay & Lesbian Advocates & Defenders
(GLAD), a public-interest legal organization working throughout New England for
equality and justice for gay, lesbian, bisexual, transgender people and people with
HIV/AIDS.
1. I owe a big debt of gratitude to Fatma Marouf, who provided extensive research
and significant written contributions to this piece. Many thanks as well to the following
people who talked to me at great length about the ideas contained in this Article, as well
as legal issues relating to this topic: Paisley Currah, Susan Donnelly, Martha Ertman,
Stephanie Gaynor, Shannon Minter and Liz Seaton.
2. This Article presumes that transgender people-people who do not conform to
stereotypes of masculinity or femininity-should have the same rights to housing, credit,
public accommodations, health care and equal treatment in employment that non-
transgender people have. This right to equal treatment is what is meant in this Article
by references to "trans rights."
This Article takes a broad view of who transgender people are. By using broad
nomenclature, trans rights are meant to include the rights of all gender nonconforming
people (which may include pre- and post-operative transsexual people, feminine men and
masculine women, as well as those people who are intersexed). For more comprehensive
discussions of who may be categorized as transgender, see Mary Coombs, Characteristics
of Transgenderism, 8 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 219, 237-42 (1998); Kristine W. Holt,
Comment, Reevaluating Holloway: Title VII, Equal Protection, and the Evolution of a
Transgender Jurisprudence, 70 TEMP. L. REV. 283, 319 n.3 (1997); see also MARTINE
ROTHBIATr, THE APARTHEID OF SEX 16-19 (1995); Debbie Mitchell, Defining
Transvestism, 70 TAPESTRY J. 35, 35-36 (1995).
3. See generally, Paisley Currah & Shannon Minter, Unprincipled Exclusions: The
Struggle to Achieve Judicial and Legislative Equality for Transgender People, 7 WM. &
MARY J. WOMEN & L. 37 (2000) (analyzing statutes and ordinances that purport to
protect transgender people); Symposium, Queer Law 1999: Current Issues In Lesbian,
Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Law, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 279 (1999) (compiling
articles and commentary).
4. The faulty reasoning in cases excluding transgender people from protections
under sex discrimination laws suggests judges were motivated more by bias than legal
reasoning. E.g., Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc. 742 F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1984) (carefully
distinguishing among transsexuals, transvestites and homosexuals, but then lumping
together transsexuals and homosexuals for the purpose of statutory construction). For a
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Orwellian rhetoric5 in those cases suggests that it is bias and
bigotry, rather than logic, that determined their outcomes.
Because prejudice against trans people is extraordinarily
ingrained and pervasive, 6 there needs to be a long-term litigation
strategy (rather than an immediate full frontal7 attack) to
reverse the trend of earlier negative decisions and to build on
recent precedent that establishes trans rights. 8 In addition to
creating the building blocks necessary to overturn earlier bad
cases, a long-term strategy would provide the time necessary for
political activists to continue to move forward, laying the
groundwork through coordinated educational 9 and legislative
strategies. 10 This work that has already begun in earnest is
detailed discussion of the problems of statutory construction, see Susan E. Keller,
Operations of Legal Rhetoric: Examining Transsexual and Judicial Identity, 34 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 329, 375-77 (1999).
In the earlier case of Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659 (9th Cir.
1977), the court narrowly framed the issue as "whether an employee may be discharged,
consistent with Title VII, for initiating the process of sex transformation." Id. at 661
(emphasis added). In reality, the issue raised by the case included pre- and post-
operative transsexual employees alike.
5. See discussion and source cited infra note 133. The Ninth Circuit found a
meaningful distinction between sex and "change of sex," which rendered discrimination
because of the former, but not the latter, actionable under Title VII.
6. The National Coalition of Anti-Violence Programs Annual Report on Anti-
Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender (LGBT) Violence reported that although anti-
transgender violence accounted for only about two to four percent of incidents between
1995 and 1999, those incidents accounted for approximately twenty percent of all
reported anti-LGBT murders, and approximately forty percent of total incidents of police-.
initiated violence. See Sticks and Stones: The Nexus Between Hate Speech and Violence,
27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 283, 391-96 (1999). Despite these figures, the Hate Crime
Prevention Act of 1999, S. 622, 106th Cong. (1999), H.R. 1082, 106th Cong. (1999), which
would have amended 18 U.S.C. § 245 to include gender, was defeated. Id.
7. The use of the term "full frontal" (as in full frontal attack), including its graphic
association with anatomy, is intentional. The power (and shock) of a full frontal is
highlighted by recent movies like THE CRYING GAME (Miramax, 1992) and THE FULL
MON'Y (Fox, 1997). As the protagonists in these films understood, a full frontal view
typically evokes a strong response. Getting the desired response, however, as the
protagonists learned, often requires doing significant work to create the right context or
set the stage for the full frontal. This Article argues that selecting the right time for a
full frontal attack and taking the time and opportunities to do the educational work in
the courts, as well as the culture, is critical to paving the road to trans rights.
8. See infra part IV.A.
9. Trans advocacy has begun in earnest with the establishment of several national
advocacy groups dedicated to creating awareness of trans people and our concerns.
Examples include It's Time America, Gender Public Advocacy Coalition and National
Transgender Advocacy Coalition. The work of these groups includes educating
individuals about the need to include trans people in non-discrimination laws.
10. For example, Minnesota enacted an anti-discrimination law in 1993 that
expressly protects transgender and gender variant people in employment, housing and
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critical to achieving the long term goals articulated in this
Article.
The long, hard struggle to end segregation laws and
practices in this country offers an analogous context from which
trans civil rights activists can draw some guidance. Today,
nearly11 no one would argue that the principle of "separate but
equal," articulated in Plessy v. Ferguson,12 was anything other
than a specious attempt to use seemingly principled legal
analysis to maintain white supremacy. 13 Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court waited nearly sixty years before overturning the
public accommodations.. Minnesota's law also provides enhanced penalties for hate
crimes committed against these groups. See PAISLEY CURRAH & SHANNON MINTER,
POLICY INST. OF THE NATL GAY & LESBIAN TASK FORCE & NAT'L CTR. FOR LESBIAN
RIGHTS, TRANSGENDER EQUALITY: A HANDBOOK FOR ACTIVISTS AND POLICYMAKERS 17,
67-68 (2000), available at http://www.ngltf.org/library/index. cfm. California amended its
state hate crimes statute to include transgender and gender variant people in 1998 and
Vermont and Missouri adopted similar measures in 1999. Id. In 2000, bills that would
create state-wide non-discrimination laws for trans people were introduced in California,
Hawaii, Illinois, Maine and Vermont. Id. On November 9, 2000, the Connecticut
Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities issued a declaratory ruling that
transgender people are covered by the state's law prohibiting sex discrimination. See
Declaratory Ruling on Behalf of John/Jane Doe (Conn. Comm'n Human Rights &
Opportunities Nov. 9, 2000), at http://www.state.ct.us/chro/metapages/hearingoffice/
declaratoryrulings /DRDoe.htm (Nov. 9, 2000) thereinafter Declaratory Ruling]; see also
Underwood v. Archer Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 857 F. Supp. 96, 99 (D.D.C. 1994) (finding that
the termination of a post-operative transsexual person for "retaining some masculine
traits" violated the District of Columbia Human Rights Act that specifically prohibits
discrimination due to appearance); City of Chicago, v. Wilson, 389 N.E.2d 522, 525 (Ill.
1978) (holding unconstitutional, as applied to tranagender defendants, a Chicago
ordinance that fined persons appearing in public "in a dress not belonging to his or her
sex, with intent to conceal his or her sex"); Doe v. McConn, 489 F. Supp 76, 79-80 (S.D.
Tex. 1980) (holding a Houston ordinance that made it unlawful for any person to appear
in public dressed with intent to disguise his/her true sex as that of the opposite sex
unconstitutional as applied to individuals undergoing psychiatric therapy in preparation
for sex-reassignment surgery). For a summary of ordinances protecting transgenders
across the country, see Currah & Minter, supra note 3, at app.
11. The modifier "nearly" is used here only to note the persistence of racist voices
that would turn back the clock on critical legal victories of the Twentieth Century that
chipped away at the stranglehold of racism in this country. See Kim Murphy, Jury
Verdict Could Bankrupt Aryans, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2000, at A1; Sean Scully, Southern
Party Ready to "Ride with Forrest," WASH. TIMES, July 3, 2000, at Al.
12. 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Ed., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
13. Though there is nearly no remaining controversy regarding the sophistry behind
the reasoning of Plessy, recalling the Court's reasoning helps spotlight the bigotry behind
the outcome. The Court wrote that "the underlying fallacy" of plaintiffs challenge to
segregated conditions was "the assumption that the enforced separation of the two races
stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority. If this be so, it is not by reason of
anything found in the act, but solely because the colored race chooses to put that
construction upon it." Id. at 551.
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constitutional principle of "separate but equal" in Brown v.
Board of Education. 14
The sequence of legal events leading to Brown was not
coincidental or happenstance. To the contrary, it was the result
of an extraordinarily thoughtful and intricate strategy devised
and implemented by the brilliant, idealistic and pragmatic
Charles Hamilton Houston. 15 This Article looks to those plans
drawn up by the architect of the modern Civil Rights movement
as the inspiration for a trans rights litigation strategy.
After briefly detailing the life of Charles Hamilton Houston,
Section II focuses on the legal strategy he designed and carried
out to overturn Plessy. It continues by drawing some conclusions
about what Houston's plan teaches about the struggle for trans
rights and a trans litigation strategy. Section III examines the
reasons certain cases that challenge assumptions about sex and
gender, such as those brought in the employment context that
raise the specter of "men in dresses," as well as those that raise
questions about who gets to use what bathroom, may not be
ideal initial cases to pursue. This Article argues that avoiding
such cases early on in the struggle for trans rights in favor of
other, less emotionally charged ones, would be most effective in
creating trans-positive law. This incremental approach, while
far from ideal, would allow time to do the important work of
educating society about the incorrect assumptions upon which
sex stereotypes are based and the harm that results therefrom.
Section IV details some of the construction materials that are
already in place upon which to build a strategy based on
Houston's model. Finally, Section V describes a recent case
brought on behalf of a transgender person that fits into the
strategy described here and explores how that case may provide
the next step in this Charles Hamilton Houston model of
pursuing trans rights through impact litigation.
II. CHARLES HAMILTON HOUSTON-PROVIDING A PLAN
Surely a visionary, Charles Hamilton Houston was the
primary architect of the legal strategy for overturning the
principle of "separate but equal" established in Plessy. Sadly, he
14. 347 U.S. at 494-95; see Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects:
The Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1127-29
(1997).
15. RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 106 (1976); GENNA RAE MCNEIL,




died four years before the culmination of his life's work. It is his
patience and long-term view that provide inspiration and legal
strategies for others involved in other civil rights struggles.
Other authors have chronicled his life's work and penned worthy
tributes to his opus. 16 This Article does not purport to be a
biography of Houston, nor can it do justice to the depth and
breadth of his work. Rather, it hopes to draw some guidance
from his life, highlighting some of his thoughts and strategies in
the process.
Houston was born in 1895,17 one year before the Supreme
Court's decision in Plessy v. Ferguson. Educated at Harvard
Law School, he was considered to be '"one of the brightest men
on campus.'" 18 After graduating from Harvard, having served on
the editorial board of its law review, he spent a period of time
traveling and studying abroad, practicing in a private firm,
teaching law and serving as the dean of Howard University's law
school. He was the "central figure in Howard's efforts to gain
accreditation,"19 thus legitimating the legal education of African-
Americans and building the basis for educating an army of
lawyers to carry out the civil rights litigation plan he was in the
process of designing.20
In 1935, Houston took a crucial step in implementing this
plan, leaving Howard University Law School so he could serve as
Special Counsel to the National Association for the Advancement
of Colored People (NAACP). Although he was initially reluctant
to accept the position with the NAACP, he eventually did so "'on
the condition that the program of litigation be conducted as a
protracted legal struggle based on . . . cases.' He opposed an
immediate frontal attack on the 'separate but equal' doctrine,
favoring a more methodical approach at the state and federal
levels."21 He defended his approach on the grounds that it
would: (1) "lay the groundwork for the test cases that would
ultimately come before the United States Supreme Court"22 and
serve as the foundation for overturning Plessy, (2) provide the
16. E.g., KLUGER, supra note 15, at 105-280; MCNEIL, supra note 15; J. Clay Smith,
Jr., Forgotten Hero, 98 HARV. L. REV. 482 (1984) (reviewing GENNA RAE MCNEL,
GROUNDWORKJ CHARLES HAMILTON HOUSTON AND THE STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS
(1983)).
17. MCNEIL, supra note 15, at 24; Smith, supra note 16, at 483.
18. See MCNEIL, supra note 15, at 51 (quoting Interview with R.P. Alexander (Sept.
18, 1972)).
19. See Smith, supra note 16, at 486.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 488 (quoting MCNEIL, supra note 15, at 134).
22. Id.
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time necessary to engage in broadscale educational efforts to
change minds in the "court of public opinion,"23 and (3) "[alllow
Houston time to develop competent Black lawyers to 'Wage the
fight that no white men could be expected to sustain.'"24
One of the key pieces to the foundation Houston laid was the
choice not to wage an immediate and direct attack on "separate
but equal," but rather to target cases in which related issues2 5
would be decided, destabilizing the foundations of Plessy in a
piecemeal fashion.26 Houston's plan worked, in part, because he
focused on areas in which whites were most vulnerable to attack
and least likely to respond emotionally. 27 For example, Houston
chose to focus his efforts first on desegregating graduate and
professional schools, only later moving to secondary and
eventually primary education, which stirred stronger racist
emotions.28 When Houston did shift his focus to elementary
education, he started outside of the classroom. For example,
Houston sought to equalize the transportation available to black
and white school children during a time when white children
were bused to school if they lived far away but black
schoolchildren had to walk regardless of the distance.29 Although
many moderate whites would not express anger at the idea of
providing additional facilities to black school children, they
might be more easily angered at the notion of providing for
blacks when they perceived these provisions as detracting from
whites. 30
23. In an article published in the official NAACP magazine, Houston wrote, "Law
suits mean little unless supported by public opinion." MCNEIL, supra note 15, at 139
(quoting Charles Hamilton Houston, Don't Shout Too Soon, CRISIS 43, Mar., 1936, at 79).
24. KLUGER, supra note 15, at 136 (citation omitted).
25. For example, Houston proposed initially targeting school systems that were
separate but clearly unequal. E.g., Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337
(1938). To make the point even clearer, Houston began targeting educational facilities in
states that provided no graduate professional programs for blacks, much less separate
ones. E.g., Pearson v. Murray, 182 A. 590, 594 (Md. 1936) (holding that a black applicant
meeting the University of Maryland law school's requirements for admission was entitled
to a writ of mandamus compelling his admission).
26. MCNEIL, supra note 15, at 134.
27. KLUGER, supra note 15, at 136.
28. MCNEIL, supra note 15, at 135.
29. Earlier cases upheld segregated school programs even though their existence
forced black schoolchildren to walk farther than their white counterparts. E.g., Dameron
v. Bayless, 126 P. 273, 274-75 (Ariz. 1912) (holding that distance, inconvenience and the
existence of railroad tracks on the route to school were irrelevant to the issue of equality
of schools). Houston saw challenges to school transportation as a way to create a
bulwark in elementary education long before he thought the time was right for a direct
challenge to segregation in elementary education. MCNEIL, supra note 15, at 137.
30. Houston pointed to two other reasons for focusing on transportation: First, the
consolidation of rural schools depended on getting children to school at a reasonable
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Only a step-by-step process could generate the long-term
effects that Houston desired. Houston recognized that the
"[1]aw [is] ... effective .. . always within its limitations," 31 and
it would be '"too much to expect the court to go against the
established and crystallized social customs." 32 White people
strongly supported segregation, relying largely on essentialist
notions about differences between whites and blacks.33 Such
notions about the racial differences and moral inferiority of some
races are today largely rejected, but still firmly held with regard
to sex.34 At the time of Houston's work, many whites still
subscribed to the nineteenth century idea that blacks were
inherently intellectually and morally inferior and could weaken
the white race just by interracial association. Those whites who
were more "progressive" feared interracial marriage and the
attendant fears of amalgamation or marginalization of the white
race.35 One Southern school principal expressed his support for
segregation by suggesting that African-Americans were not as
fully human as whites: '"[Black children] are like little animals.
There is no civilization in their homes. They shouldn't hold up
white children who have had these things for centuries. They are
not as clean .... Why should we contaminate our race?' 36 This
reasoning was hardly isolated. Even in the North, the number of
segregated schools increased dramatically between 1910 and
1940, especially at the elementary school level. 37
time; and second, plodding to school did psychological damage by creating an "inferiority
complex." MCNEIL, supra note 15, 137.
31. Id. at 134 (quoting Charles Hamilton Houston & Leon Ransom, The George
Crawford Case: An Experiment in Social Statesmanship, NATION, July 4, 1934, at 18).
32. Id. at 135 (quoting Charles Hamilton Houston, "Proposed Legal Attacks on
Education Discrimination," 8, C429, NAACP Records (on file with author)).
33. Herbert Hovenkamp, Social Science and Segregation Before Brown,. 1985 DUKE
L.J. 624, 637-42.
34. See Ashlie v. Chester-Upland Sch. Dist., No. CIV.A.78-4037, 1979 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 12516, at **14-15 (E.D. Pa. May 9, 1979) (analogizing a transsexual individual's
right of privacy to that of an individual who sought to be surgically changed into a
donkey); Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223, 231 (Tex. App. 1999) ("There are some things
we cannot will into being. They just are.").
35. STEVEN J. GOULD, THE MISMEASURE OF MAN 105-73 (1981) (discussing and
criticizing nineteenth century studies on race).
36. Davison M. Douglas, The Limits of Law in Accomplishing Racial Change: School
Segregation in the Pre-Brown North, 44 UCLA L. REV. 677, 711-12 (1997) (quoting
CHARLES S. JOHNSON, PATTERNS OF NEGRO SEGREGATION 198 (1943)).
37. Id. at 705-10 (discussing the increase in segregation of primary schools in New
Jersey, Ohio and Illinois between 1910 and 1940). Segregation took the form of 'separate
schools, separate buildings on the same plot of land, and separate classrooms within the
same building." Id. at 709.
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Even courts that understood the inequity of racial
segregation as a basic social construct, as well as "neutral"
judges, often minimized glaring discrepancies between white and
black schools when analyzing "equality" under the "separate but
equal" doctrine. 38 One article published in the 1954 Harvard
Law Review openly recognized that decisions "inevitably
result[ed], at least in part, from subjective influences which have
little to do with the law or the bare facts in the record." 39
Perhaps the most powerful influence was the essentialist idea
that "[tihe separation of the human family into races .. .is as
certain as anything in nature."40 Instead of analyzing the
complex distinctions between substantial and insubstantial
equality, judges invoked comfortable, clear categories that most
whites seemed to accept.
Just as white people feared interracial mixing because it
could lead to miscegenation, a disruption of the "natural" state of
belonging definitively to one race or another,41 transgender
people seem to unsettle what sociologists term the "natural
attitude," the assumption "that every human being is either a
male or a female."42 For those who subscribe to this view of
binary sexes as natural, transgender people are extraordinarily
threatening because we "call into question the idea that
[existing] gender categories are discrete, mutually exclusive, and
stable."43 This fear of destabilization of gender categories seems
to lead courts to act in irrational ways. For example, in Littleton
v. Prange,44 a Texas appeals court refused to recognize a
transsexual woman as legally female despite the fact that she
underwent sex-reassignment surgery and legally changed her
birth certificate. 45 The court's primary justification for refusing
to recognize Christie Lee Littleton's medical and legal status
38. Robert A. Leflar & Wylie H. Davis, Segregation in the Public Schools--1953, 67
HARV. L. REV. 377, 399 (1954).
39. Id. At 394.
40. Berea Coll. v. Commonwealth, 94 S.W. 623, 626 (Ky. 1906), affd, 211 U.S. 45
(1908) (upholding a law prohibiting racially integrated education in Kentucky). For a
more extensive discussion of this case, see Hovenkamp, supra note 33, at 630-31.
41. The Kentucky court stated that "from social amalgamation it is but a step to
illicit intercourse, and but another to intermarriage." Berea, 94 S.W. at 628.
42. SUZANNE KESSLER & WENDY MCKENNA, GENDER: AN ETHNOMETHODOLOGICAL
APPROACH 1 (1978).
43. Adrienne Hiegel, Note, Sexual Exclusions: The Americans with Disabilities Act as
a Moral Code, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1451, 1483 (1994).
44. 9 S.W.3d 223 (Tex. App. 1999).
45. Id. at 231; see also In re Estate of Gardiner, Estate No. 9908 PE 00119, slip op. at
7-9 (Dist. Ct. Kan. Jan. 21, 2000) (using language from Littleton verbatim in granting
summary judgment against the surviving transsexual spouse in a probate action).
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sounds very much like a dictatorial parent who refuses to
explain a decision by pulling rank, saying "because I say so." The
Littleton court ignored medical and legal evidence and concluded
that Littleton is male by saying tersely that some things "just
are."46 This court's irrational, knee-jerk analysis demonstrates
the need for a long-term strategy to secure trans rights, one that
accounts for social, as well as legal impediments to trans rights,
just as Houston's did. The strategy proposed here, which
sketches out guidelines for cases to litigate, analogizes gender
binarists 47 to the racist opponents Houston faced.
III. EARLY CASES TO AVOID TRAVELLING ON THE ROAD AHEAD
Viewing the road ahead to securing trans civil rights
through the Houston lens counsels in favor of crafting an
analogous long-term litigation strategy. Identifying cases in
which gender binarists are both most vulnerable and least likely
to react out of anger or other emotions is key to any long-term
strategy to secure rights for transgender people. Like Houston's,
this approach requires a concurrent, aggressive cultural
education component focused on exposing the myths of sex
stereotypes and highlighting the damage they do.
Generally speaking, gender binarists seem most threatened,
angriest, and irrationally emotional 48 when faced with cases in
46. Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 231.
47. For lack of better term, I use "gender binarists" to refer to people who cling
tightly to a binary division of the sexes. That is, people who believe one is born either a
woman or a man and that there is neither fluidity nor permeability to those categories.
Further, most gender binarists think that the categories of male and female are discrete,
having no points of overlap. The fiercest of gender binarists would support the outcome
in Littleton, see supra note 34 and accompanying text, where a Texas appeals court
determined that despite both legal and medical evidence to the contrary, Christie Lee
Littleton was a man because the doctors had ascribed to her that sex category at her
birth. Other gender binarists may be more "moderate" in their beliefs. For example, I
would still ascribe the term gender binarist to those who "do not view the recognition of
different dress norms for males and females to be offensive or illegal stereotyping," even
though they may object to a particular justification for a given dress code. Carroll v.
Talman Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 604 F.2d 1028, 1033 n.17 (7th Cir. 1979) (striking down
dress code based on the premise that "women cannot be expected to exercise good
judgment in choosing business apparel, whereas men can").
48. Cases involving transgender school teachers have yielded negative precedent that
relies upon the style of rhetoric used by nineteenth century white separatists. Grossman
v. Bernards Township Bd. of Educ., No. 74-1904, 1975 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16261, at *2
(D.N.J. Sept. 10, 1975) (holding that by changing sex, Grossman "underwent a
fundamental and complete change in [her] role and identification to society, thereby
rendering [herselfl incapable to teach children... because of the potential her presence
in the classroom presents for psychological harm to the students"); see also Ashlie v.
Chester-Upland Sch. Dist., No. CIV.A.78-4037, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12516, at *8 (E.D.
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two categories: (1) any claim involving a bathroom and (2) those
raising the specter of "men in dresses" in the workplace. 49 It is
the motivating forces behind these fears on which the next
sections focus.
A. About the Bathrooms
The separation of men's and women's bathrooms is a well-
established cultural practice, and indeed, one mandated by law
in some jurisdictions. 50  The specter of unisex bathrooms
apparently strikes fear in the heart of many Americans. In fact,
the threat of mandatory unisex bathrooms was an argument
used to defeat the Equal Rights Amendment in the late 1970s. 51
Even when the person who uses the "wrong" rest room is not
transgender, violating "urinary segregation"52 can provoke
hysterical reactions.53 The situation may, however, be far worse
for a transgender person whose idea of the "right" rest room
differs from that of his/her co-workers and employer.
Pa. May 9, 1979) (analogizing a transsexual teacher to an animal: "It might just as easily
be argued that the right of privacy protects a person's decision to be surgically trans-
formed into a donkey."). The Ashlie court heard extensive expert testimony as to the
.grave, psychological effects" that a transsexual school teacher would have on students.
Id. Keller argues that the Ashlie court worried that a male role model who became a
female role model might influence the sexual orientation of teenage boys. See Keller,
supra note 4, at 378. KeUer's argument is even more powerful when one takes into
account Craig Lind's assertion that "[tihe legal regulation of childhood sexuality is ...
the sphere in which the passion for the promotion of heterosexuality is most striking."
Craig Lind, Law, Childhood Innocence and Sexuality, in LEGAL QUEERIES 81, 84 (Leslie
J. Moran et al. eds., 1998). Lind points out that while people fear that "[u]nrestrained
sexual tolerance may produce divergent sexualities on a much larger scale," social
historians have shown that queer identities emerged when formal tolerance was very
low. Id. at 90. This irrational fear of transgender people teaching school was most
recently seen in the case of Dana Rivers, a popular and award-winning California
schoolteacher. Rivers was fired after she notified her principal that she intended to
undergo sex-reassignment surgery. See Eric Bailey, Teacher Quits in Settlement of Sex-
Change Furor, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 16, 1999, at A3.
49. See CURRAH & MINTER, supra note 10, at 57-60.
50. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 133 (West 1996).
51. GINETTE CASTRO, AMERICAN FEMINISM: A CONTEMPORARY HISTORY 208
(Elizabeth Loverde-Bagwel trans., 1990).
52. MARJORIE GARBER, VESTED INTERESTS: CROSSDRESSING AND CULTURAL ANXIETY
47-48 (1992) (questioning Jacques Lacan, The Agency of the Letter in the Unconscious, in
ECRITS: A SELECTION 151 (Alan Sheridan trans., Norton) (1977)).
53. The city of Houston, for example, spent $10,000 prosecuting a woman who used
the men's room at a concert because the line for the women's room was too long. Woman
Is Acquitted in Trial for Using the Men's Room, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1990, at A8.
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In several reported cases, employers instructed pre-
operative male-to-female transgender individuals not to use the
women's bathroom.5 4  This situation escalated into a written
disciplinary warning in Doe v. Boeing, Co.55 after several co-
workers complained.56  Similarly, in Sommers v. Budget
Marketing, Inc. 57 "a number of female employees indicated they
would quit if Sommers were permitted to use the restroom
facilities assigned to female personnel."58 The court upheld
Budget's dismissal of Sommers for "misrepresenting" herself as
female and causing "a disruption of the company's work
routine."59  The disruption, however, goes both ways. In
Holloway v. Arthur Anderson Co.,6° co-workers found Holloway's
use of the men's room while she was transitioning "very
disruptive and embarrassing to all concerned." 61  Although
Holloway was anatomically male, she caused "disruption" in the
men's room because her appearance was feminine. Thus, for a
transgender person, awkward situations can arise regardless of
which bathroom is used. Although sex segregation of bathrooms
has been distinguished from racial segregation of bathrooms on
the basis that sex segregation is not degrading, 62 transgender
people are degraded if segregation effectively prevents them
54. Sommers v. Budget Mktg., Inc., 667 F.2d 748, 749 (8th Cir. 1982); Dobre v. Nat'l
R.R. Passenger Corp.(AMTRACK), 850 F. Supp 284, 286 (E.D. Pa. 1993); Doe v. Boeing,
Co., 846 P.2d 531, 536 (Wash. 1993).
55. 846 P.2d 531, 536 (Wash. 1993).
56. Id. at 533.
57. 667 F.2d 748, 749 (8th Cir. 1982).
58. Id. at 748-49.
59. Id.
60. 566 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1977).
61. Id. at 661 n.1 (quoting affidavit describing "personal problems" created by
Holloway's transitioning appearance).
62. RICHARD A. WASSESTROM, PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIAL ISSUES: FIVE STUDIES 20-21
(1980); see also Louise M. Antony, Back to Androgeny: What Bathrooms Can Teach Us
About Equality, 9 J. CONTEMPT. LEGAL ISSUES 1, 4 (1998).
The purpose of segregating bathrooms [by race] was not simply to keep
whites and blacks apart, but to keep blacks from defiling the bathrooms
used by whites; it was.., instituted by whites without any consideration
of the needs and desires of blacks. The situation appears to be different,
though, with the sexual segregation of bathrooms; here the arrangement
seems as much desired by women as by men, and there is no
presumption that members of one sex can defile members of the other by
using the same toilets.
Id. This kind of analysis reinforces the notion that the essentialist's perceptions of sex
are so deeply rooted that they support the conclusion that recognizing these "differences"
has neither negative consequences nor reflects bias.
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from using either the women's room or the men's room5 or forces
them to leave the workplace to use their bathroom of choice. 64
Why does boundary crossing in bathrooms generate so much
anxiety? Two common explanations for sex-segregated
bathrooms are privacy and safety. Neither of these reasons are
immune to attack. Enclosed stalls with locks would provide
sufficient privacy; urinals may be placed in such stalls or
eliminated. 65 The objection that a mixed bathroom jeopardizes
security has been compared to homophobic myths about the
problems gays cause in the military.66 Furthermore, the
argument that single-sex bathrooms reinforce that "same sense
of mystery or forbiddenness about the other sex's sexuality
which is fostered by the general prohibition upon public nudity
and the unashamed viewing of genitalia"67  presumes
heterosexuality and compares bathroom use to much more
explicit sexual activities.
There are at least three possible solutions to the bathroom
problem. Perhaps the best solution would be the one used in
places of public accommodations, including airplanes and a
growing number of restaurants, eliminating sex segregated
bathrooms altogether and replacing them with unisex facilities.68
A second solution (that creates problems of its own) is the
creation of a third bathroom labeled "other."69 Finally, a feasible
and short-term legal solution would be to prevent employers
63. See PATRICIA WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 122-23 (1991)
(discussing a transsexual law student who was not allowed to use either the male or
female bathroom by fellow students after sex change reassignment surgery).
64. See Doe v. Boeing, Co., 846 P.2d 531, 533 n.2 (Wash. 1993). After Boeing warned
Doe not to use the women's room at work, "Doe limited her use of rest rooms to offsite
women's rest rooms at lunchtime." Id.
65. MARTINE ROTHBLATT, THE APARTHEID OF SEX: A MANIFESTO ON THE FREEDOM OF
GENDER 91-95 (1995).
66. CURRAH & MINTER, supra note 10, at 58-59 (arguing that the "bathroom debate"
and gays in the military are both based upon false notions of behavior); see also
ROTHBLATr, supra note 65, at 92-95 (arguing that single-sex bathrooms are actually less
safe than unisex bathrooms because an attacker knows that only members of the
"victim" sex will be inside).
67. WASSERSTROM, supra note 62, at 20-21.
68. See ROTHBLATT, supra note 65, at 95. Rothblatt advocates ending "sexual
apartheid [by] pass[ing] laws that mandate secure, reasonably clean, unisex restrooms
for all." Id.
69. Terry Kogan, Transsexuals and Critical Gender Theory: The Possibility of a
Restroom Labeled "Other," 48 HASTINGS L.J. 1223, 1252-55 (1997). Kogan argues that
Rothblatt's call for only unisex bathrooms "do[es] not respect the choices of MTF [male to
female] transsexuals who want to use the female restroom as an important component of
the gender identity they have assumed for themselves." Id. at 1250.
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from dictating which of the two bathrooms employees must
use.
70
Unfortunately, courts remain adverse even to the feasible
short-term legal goal proposed herein. Boeing demonstrates that
"urinary segregation" categorizes people perhaps even more
rigidly than clothing.71  Although Boeing's dress code
incorporated a flexible category of "unisex clothing," which
included "nylon stockings, earrings, lipstick, foundation, and
clear nail polish,"72 Boeing restricted Doe's use of the restroom to
her genitally ascribed sex.73 The court in Boeing refused even to
engage in a discussion of bathrooms. The court maintained,
"[t]he issue of rest room use does not alter our analysis since
neither party contends this was a basis for her discharge."74 The
disingenuousness of this conclusion is highlighted by the court's
other conclusion that Doe's attire was "deemed unacceptable
when, in the supervisor's opinion, her dress would be likely to
cause a complaint were Doe to use a men's rest room."75 The
court in Sommers v. Budget Marketing, Inc.76 similarly
dismissed the idea of permitting people to use bathrooms that
did not correspond to their anatomical sex, arguing that such a
decision would create "limitless" problems."77
Disability laws mandating accessible toilets certainly have
loosened our society's rigid notions of what public facilities
should be made available to individuals. 78 Nevertheless, it may
70. A recently enacted ordinance, No. 7040, in Boulder, Colorado, which amends the
city's laws to protect transgender people, permits transitioned transsexual people to use
the locker room and showers appropriate to their sex and states that transitioning
transsexual people will be granted "reasonable accommodation" in accessing locker
rooms and showers. CURRAH & MINTER, supra note 10, at 43-44. Unfortunately, the bill
defines "transitioned transsexual" as "a person who has completed genital reassignment
surgery," which may exclude most female-to-male transsexuals. Id. Furthermore, the
ordinance exempts people under age twenty-five from housing provisions. Id.
71. GARBER, supra note 52, at 47-48.
72. Doe v. Boeing, Co., 846 P.2d 531, 533 (Wash. 1993).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 533 n.2.
75. Id. at 534 (emphasis added).
76. 667 F.2d 748 (8th Cir. 1982).
77. Id. at 749.
78. Although much progress has been made on the bathroom front, there is a long
way to go. Urinary segregation continues to keep even non-transgender women from
equal treatment and job advancement opportunities. See, e.g., DeClue v. Cent. Ill. Light
Co., 223 F.3d 434, 436 (7th Cir. 2000) (finding that a female employee required to use the
woods as a bathroom facility, just as male co-workers did, could not bring a Title VII
claim despite the risks the accommodations posed to her privacy). Although all three
judges on the panel agreed that denying a female employee a restroom facility may
constitute impermissible discrimination under Title VII as a matter of disparate impact,
only Judge Rovner, dissenting, recognized that it may also give rise to an actionable
2000]
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take some time before society understands that in pursuing
equal access of transgender people to public accommodations, no
one is looking to have "'men in dresses' invading women's
bathrooms."79 As the next section explains, courts unfortunately
demonstrate the same emotional, irrational response to
bathroom cases that they showed in dress code cases. As a
result, these emotional issues continue to constrain judges from
issuing principled, legal decisions, a weakness that harms trans
people, civil rights law generally, and the legitimacy of the legal
system as a whole.
B. Who Cares if Men Wear Dresses?
Americans' irrational fear of unisex bathrooms is apparently
rivaled in magnitude and scope only by our fear of men wearing
dresses in the workplace. Although it is well settled that
employees should not be penalized for conduct s ° and appearance
outside of the workplace, there is unanimity that employers may
enforce dress and appearance requirements at work.81 Such
dress codes may, at the very least, require employees to adhere
to professional and socially acceptable "personal appearance,
grooming, and hygiene standards."82 In fact, the majority of
jurisdictions allow employers to enforce even sex-specific dress
codes,83 as long as such codes do not reinforce negative sex
stereotypes 84 or apply differently to men and women without any
hostile environment claim. Id. at 440 (Rovner, J., dissenting); see also Kline v. City of
Kansas City Fire Dep't, 175 F.3d 660, 668 (8th Cir. 1999) (reversing exclusion of evidence
of unequal bathroom facilities as support for a hostile environment claim brought by
female firefighters).
79. CURRAH & MINTER, supra note 10, at 58.
80. See, e.g., N.H. REV STAT. ANN. § 275:37a (1999) (prohibiting discrimination in
employment for tobacco use outside the workplace); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 201 (Consol. Supp.
Feb. 2000) (prohibiting discrimination in employment decisions on basis of lawful
recreation activities pursued by employee outside work hours).
81. Marc A. Koonin, Avoiding Claims of Discrimination Based on Personal
Appearance, Grooming and Hygiene Standards, 15 LAB. LAW. 19, 20 (1999).
82. Id.
83. See Fountain v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 555 F.2d 753, 756 (9th Cir. 1977) (holding
requirement that a male employee wear a tie is not sex discrimination for purposes of
Title VII); Willingham v. Macon Tel. Pub. Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1091-92 (5th Cir. 1975)
(upholding sex-specific hair length requirement).
84. See, e.g., Carroll v. Talman Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 604 F.2d 1028, 1030 (7th Cir.
1979) (striking down dress code that required women to wear a uniform but allowed men
to wear business suits); O'Donnell v. Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse, Inc., 656 F.
Supp. 263, 266 (S.D. Ohio 1987) (holding dress code requiring female sales clerks to wear
[Vol. 7:5
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permissible justification.85 Although recognizing trans people's
inclusion in existing non-discrimination laws would not alter
these underlying principles, many employers faced with the
issue have voiced a concern that trans rights would create
disarray in the workplace. 86
Despite the clarity and consistency of existing appearance
rules as they have evolved over time, "opposition to cross-
dressing in the workplace is perhaps the most commonly voiced
objection to transgender rights."87 In other words, a fear of "men
in dresses" in the workplace fuels most of the political opposition
to amending non-discrimination law to include transgender
people and, therefore, may be viewed as one of the knee-jerk and
arguably irrational concerns of those who oppose trans rights. 88
What is behind this fear of "men in dresses" in the workplace
that causes otherwise confident employers and co-workers to
respond so irrationally? The three articulable explanations are
(1) sexism, (2) concerns about customer expectations and
preferences and (3) fear of eroding employer control in the
workplace.
Laws enforcing sex-specific appearance requirements have
old roots. Sumptuary laws date at least as far back as the
thirteenth century, reflecting government-enforced social and
economic status distinctions.8 9 Early Colonial American law also
incorporated strict dress restrictions. 90
Because strict, gendered clothing requirements have
perpetuated the subordination of women, the feminist movement
in the United States has long focused on changing norms of
"smock" while allowing male sales clerks to wear shirt and tie impermissible because it
perpetuated sex stereotypes).
85. See, e.g., Gerdom v. Cont'l Airlines, Inc., 692 F.2d 602, 605-06 (9th Cir. 1982)
(finding Continental's desire to compete by featuring attractive female cabin attendants
insufficient to support discriminatory weight requirement); Frank v. United Airlines,
Inc., 216 F.3d 845, 853-55 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that United's discriminatory weight
requirement bore no relation to female flight attendant's ability to carry out her duties).
86. CURRAH & MINTER, supra note 10, at 55.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. See ALAN HUNT, GOVERNANCE OF THE CONSUMING PASSION: A HISTORY OF
SUMPTUARY LAW 214-15 (1996).
90. See DAVID H. 'FLAHERTY, PRIVACY IN COLONIAL NEW ENGLAND 184-88 (1972)
(describing sumptuary laws in Colonial New England). By the eighteenth century, these
laws were rarely enforced. Id. at 185.
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permissible appearance requirements. 91 Despite their focus on
changing appearance requirements for women, feminists have
also realized that "[aippearance regulations are... of particular
importance to women, even when men are the apparent
victims."92 As a result of focused efforts to alter strict clothing
requirements that subordinate women, it is absurd to think that
anyone would support an employer firing a woman for wearing a
masculine styled tailored suit. In fact, some jurisdictions have
prohibited such an action. 93 Apparently, the same adverse action
when taken against a man in a dress does not draw the same ire.
Reconciling this inconsistency is difficult or impossible and can
hardly be justified other than by stark sexism.
Similarly, the rationalization that a man in a dress in the
workplace would provoke negative customer responses cannot be
reconciled with the case law regarding customer preferences and
race. An employer who refused to hire an employee of color using
the same justification would be seen by a court as engaging in a
pretext for impermissible discrimination. 94
Finally, the explanation that one opposes "men in dresses"
in the workplace because employers would lose control of the
workplace is difficult to understand as anything other than a
misunderstanding about transgender people in the first place.
The justification is rooted in a misperception that some
individual (male) employees would want to wear female
gendered clothing simply to antagonize his employer. This could
only happen if an employer were invested in enforcing gendered
appearance norms. In other words, even if an employer could
not prohibit a man from wearing a dress in the workplace, it
could still enforce non-sex specific appearance norms that allow
91. Professor Katherine Franke submitted an amicus brief in Rosa v. Park West Bank
& Trust Co., detailing the history of sex-based appearance requirements and the role
clothing has played in the struggle for women's equality. Brief of Amicus Curiae NOW
Legal Defense et al., at 2-23, Rosa v. Park W. Bank & Trust Co., 214 F.3d 213 (1st Cir.
2000) (No. 99-2309).
92. Mary Whisner, Note, Gender.Specific Clothing Regulation: A Study in
Patriarchy, 5 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 73, 75 (1982).
93. CAL. GOVT CODE § 12947.5 (West Supp. 2001); CURRAH & MINTER, supra note 10,
at 43-50.
94. See Sarni Original Dry Cleaners, Inc. v. Cooke, 447 N.E.2d 1228, 1232-33 (Mass.
1983) (perceived safety problems of anticipated racial attacks no justification for
discrimination); cf Fernandez v. Wynn Oil Co., 653 F.2d 1273, 1276-77 (9th Cir. 1981)
("Nor does stereotyped consumer preferences justify a sexually discriminatory practice.");
Vigars v. Valley Christian Ctr., 805 F. Supp. 802, 808-10 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (firing of an
unmarried pregnant librarian at a Christian school because of possible "offensiveness"
raises an issue of fact for Title VII purposes); Wilson v. Southwest Airlines Co., 517 F.
Supp. 292, 302-04 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (rejecting customer preference argument for
Southwest Airlines' policy to only hire women as flight attendants).
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the employer to make even unreasonable rules (as long as not
sex discriminatory ones) regarding appropriate professional
attire.95
Unfortunately, there may be no quick fix for the apparently
pervasive emotional response to the specter of "men in dresses"
in the workplace, The optimal solution would be for everyone to
get over their strongly held sexist beliefs about appropriate
attire for men and women. Short of that, there may be some
near-term solution that allows employers to self-identify their
gender and require employees to dress consistent with prevailing
gender norms. For example, at least one transgender non-
discrimination law limits the number of times employees can
alter their expressed gender in the workplace.96 This solution
does not seem to get at the heart of the problem regarding
sexism and is, therefore, far less than optimal.
In any case, the lesson to be drawn from Houston's work is
that in order to secure trans rights, advocates may have to wait
to tackle head-on the most difficult cases until some smaller
victories can be secured. Where that is not possible, advocates
should recognize the full implications of going forward in such
cases, including the heightened emotional responses they may
elicit from the judiciary.
Consistent with Houston's model, one can conjecture that
courts would be more rational and, one can hope, more even-
handed in applying relevant law in cases that question
assumptions of gender binarism, but do not pose a full frontal
attack on widely shared core beliefs about the normativity of sex.
In other words, courts may act irrationally and out of bias and
bigotry when confronted with cases that pose a direct attack on
the sex discrimination inherent in practices premised on the
belief that sex binarism is "natural." Clearly that will be the
situation in cases challenging sex discriminatory practices that
preclude a transgender person (ascribed male at birth, for
example) from wearing feminine attire in the workplace or a
case in which a transgender person wishes to use a restroom
facility designated for the sex the transgender person was not
ascribed at birth.
Fortunately, steering clear of these two narrow categories of
cases, segregated bathrooms and "men in dresses" in the
workplace (though admittedly very important ones in the day-to-
day lives of trans people), does not preclude the possibility of
95. See, e.g., Koonin, supra note 81, at 21.
96. CURAH & MINTER, supra note 10, at 44.
20001
22 WILLIAM AND MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW
bringing other, less emotionally volatile cases to challenge the
sex discrimination many transgender people face. For example,
many transgender people also face serious discrimination in the
context of public accommodations, health care, lending,
recreational sport, prison and the "quasi-employment" context
where discrimination comes from some non-employer entity. 97
This Article argues that bringing cases in these areas first will
lay the groundwork, like the gradual assault on race
discrimination led by Houston, for challenging historic
misinterpretations of sex discrimination prohibitions that
irrationally exclude transgender people from coverage under
existing laws.
IV. CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS ALREADY IN PLACE
Despite early failures in the Title VII context, 98 there is no
principled way to exclude transgender people from the coverage
of sex discrimination prohibitions, whether in employment,
housing, credit, public accommodations or sports. Nonetheless,
insights gained from Houston's model suggest certain cases that
evoke irrational fears could be avoided early on in the struggle to
secure trans rights in order to create the legal building blocks,
which will become the foundation for these other, "harder" cases.
The key to the proposed model is to use existing precedent,
already firmly in place, to reverse the trend of exclusion for trans
plaintiffs, a redirection that has already begun.99
The first and perhaps strongest argument is that older Title
VII cases bringing sex discrimination claims on behalf of
transgender plaintiffs are no longer controlling after Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins1° ° and Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore
Services, Inc.10 1 In addition, the court in Schwenk v. Hartford10 2
explicitly overruled the Ninth Circuit decision that spawned the
exclusion for trans people from Title VII in the first place. 10 3
Second, the case of Price Waterhouse made explicit the legal
97. Id. at 9-10. Consider the sex-specific dress requirements imposed by courts on
female and male attorneys. In one "quasi-employment" case, a judge told a black
attorney he could not wear a kente cloth in the courtroom. John Murawski, Colorful
Cloth Has Judges Seeing Red, LEGAL TIMES, July 6, 1992, at 6.
98. E.g., Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1084-87 (7th Cir. 1984); Holloway
v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 661-64 (9th Cir. 1977).
99. See discussion infra Part IV.A-B.
100. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
101. 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
102. 204 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2000).
103. Holloway, 566 F.2d at 659.
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principle that sex stereotyping is an impermissible form of sex
discrimination. 104  Therefore, discrimination because of an
individual's failure to meet sex stereotypes is actionable. 0 5
Third, an emerging body of law decided under state and
international sex discrimination prohibitions rejects the
Orwellian logic upon which the early Title VII cases rely. 106
Finally, looking at the root of discrimination against transgender
people in nearly any fact-specific context reveals the sex
discrimination that underlies the anti-trans animus. According
to the logic drawn from Houston's experiences, over time and by
pursuing a carefully crafted litigation strategy, trans people will
receive the protections we deserve under existing laws.
A. Outdated Title VII Case Law Is Inapplicable After Price
Waterhouse and Oncale
In most cases brought by trans plaintiffs, litigants can
anticipate that defendants will move to dismiss claims in
reliance on outdated Title VII case law. 10 7 Judges may not rely
upon those cases to dismiss a claim of discrimination under state
or federal sex discrimination law where the reasoning behind
them has been vitiated by subsequent United States Supreme
Court decisions. As the Ninth Circuit recently explained, "[tihe
initial judicial approach taken in cases such as Holloway has
been overruled by the logic and language of Price Waterhouse."108
In those "cases such as Holloway,"10 9 courts found that the
parameters of Title VII's prohibitions against sex discrimination
did not apply to protect transgender people who faced
discrimination in employment for two reasons, neither of which
can be justified in light of recent case law. First, they narrowly
held that Title VII's sex discrimination prohibitions did not
"apply to anything other than the traditional concept of sex."110
Second, "[a]lthough the maxim that remedial statutes should be
104. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 239-40.
105. Id. at 258.
106. See infra Part IV.C-D.
107. Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984); Sommers v. Budget
Mktg., Inc., 667 F.2d 748 (8th Cir. 1982); Holoway, 566 F.2d at 659.
108. Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1201 (9th Cir. 2000) (footnote omitted). In
Schwenk, the transgender plaintiff stated a claim of sex discrimination by evidence of
"her assumption of a feminine rather than a typically masculine appearance or
demeanor." Id. at 1201.
109. Id.
110. Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1085.
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liberally construed is well recognized," 1 1 courts found nothing in
the legislative history of Title VII that suggested Congress ever
intended to expand the definition of sex "beyond its common and
traditional interpretation."112
The Supreme Court, in more recent decisions, has toppled
both of the pillars upon which Wane and its progeny rest. In
1989, the Supreme Court soundly rejected the notion that sex
discrimination only contemplates sex as it is traditionally
understood, that is the sense of one being either a biological male
or a biological female. 113 As Justice Brennan explained, Price
Waterhouse could not defend a sex discrimination charge by
arguing that sex stereotyping "lacks legal relevance." 114
In Price Waterhouse, the Supreme Court answered the
question, begged by the Seventh Circuit in lane, of whether
Congress meant to include the nontraditional within the term
"sex" as used in Title VII. 115 As Justice Brennan explained, in
passing Title VII, "'Congress intended to strike at the entire
spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women resulting
from sex stereotypes.'" 116 As explained in Price Waterhouse,
Title VII covers more than a narrow concept of sex. 117
The United States Supreme Court overturned the basis for
the second pillar upon which Wane and the other Title VII cases
relied even more recently, in a case in which the Court
considered whether Title VII prohibits same-sex sexual
harassment.118 In an opinion by Justice Scalia, the Supreme
Court determined that nothing in the legislative history of Title
VII suggests Congress intended to prohibit same-sex sexual
harassment.119  Nevertheless, the Court recognized that
"statutory prohibitions often go beyond the principal evil to cover
reasonably comparable evils, and it is ultimately the provisions
of our laws rather than the principal concerns of our legislators
by which we are governed." 120 The Court stated explicitly that
sex discrimination includes sexual harassment and this holding
111. Id. at 1086.
112. Id.
113. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250-58 (1989).
114. See id. at 250-51.
115. Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1086.
116. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251 (quoting Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444
F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir. 1971)).
117. See id. at 228.
118. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 76 (1998).




"must extend to sexual harassment of any kind that meets the
statutory requirements." 121
In Holloway and its progeny, the courts mistakenly limited
sex discrimination prohibitions to only one type and declined to
prohibit employers from discriminating against transgender
people, 122 even if such discrimination met the statutory
definition of sex discrimination under Title VII. The Oncale case
clarifies that, although not the principal evil Congress had in
mind, Title VII's sex discrimination prohibitions must extend to
any kind of sex discrimination. This is particularly true where
statutory prohibitions against sex discrimination are recognized
to include sex stereotyping. 123
B. Discrimination Against Trans People Is Impermissible Sex
Stereotyping
Discrimination against a transgender person is
impermissible sex discrimination when an employer treats a
transgender employee adversely because of a failure to meet sex
stereotypes. 124 As the Ninth Circuit recently explained, "What
matters, for purposes of this ... analysis, is that in the mind of
the perpetrator the discrimination is related to the sex of the
victim."125 In the case of a trans plaintiff, the allegation may be
that the defendant's actions stem from the fact that the
defendant believed the plaintiff to be a man or woman who
"failed to act like one."126
In Price Waterhouse, the Supreme Court considered a case in
which Ann Hopkins, a female associate, was denied partnership
at a nationwide accounting firm, in part because some of the
partners reacted negatively to her manner of dress and "macho"
personality.127 Hopkins was told that in order to improve her
chances for partnership she should "'walk more femininely, talk
121. Id. at 80.
122. Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1084-86 (7th Cir. 1984); Holloway v.
Arthur Anderson & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 661-64 (9th Cir. 1977).
123. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 228 (1989).
124. Id.; Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 260-61 n.4 (1st Cir.
1999) (indicating that "a man can ground a [sex discrimination] claim on evidence that
other men discriminated against him because he did not meet stereotyped expectations
of masculinity"). See generally Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2000)
(arguing that discrimination based on failure to conform to gender stereotypes is
impermissible).
125. Schwenk, 204 F.3d at 1202.
126. Id.
127. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 234-35.
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more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her
hair styled, and wear jewelry.'"'128 Holding that decisions based
on sex-typical behavior constitute impermissible sex
discrimination, the Court affirmed that "we are beyond the day"
when employers may insist that employees "match . . . the
stereotype associated with their group [because] '[iun forbidding
employers to discriminate against individuals because of their
sex, Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of
disparate treatment of men and women resulting from sex
stereotypes."1 29
Indeed, rejecting the need for expert testimony to prove that
sex stereotyping had played a role in Hopkins' case, Justice
Brennan commented that it requires no expertise in psychology
to know that if an employee's abilities can be "corrected by a
soft-hued suit or a new shade of lipstick, perhaps it is the
employee's sex and not" her abilities that has drawn criticism.
130
In other words, the Price Waterhouse Court held as a matter of
law that it constituted sex discrimination for Hopkins' employer
to require her to conform her appearance to stereotypical norms
of gender. 131
Like Hopkins, a transgender plaintiff can root a
discrimination claim in sex discrimination when it is the
plaintiffs failure to meet sex stereotypes that gives rise to the
discriminatory treatment. 132 Thus, a biological male plaintiff
who transitions to become female (a transsexual woman) may
state a claim of sex discrimination against her employer when
128. Id. at 235 (citation omitted).
129. Id. at 251 (quoting Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir.
1971)).
130. Id. at 256.
131. Id. Several courts have recently applied the Price Waterhouse analysis to Title
VII and analogous state anti-discrimination laws to protect employees who are targeted
for harassment because of their failure to conform to sex stereotypes. E.g., Schmedding
v. Tnemec Co., 187 F.3d 862, 863-65 (8th Cir. 1999); EEOC v. TruGreen Ltd. P'ship, 122
F. Supp. 2d 986, 993 (W.D. Wis. 1999). The First Circuit also recently aft-rmed the
viability of such a claim where properly pled by, for example, a feminine-appearing male.
Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 260-61 (1st Cir. 1999).
In affirming that transgender people are protected by state sex discrimination
laws, the Connecticut Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities accepted the
analysis in Price Waterhouse as "more in keeping with the letter and spirit of
Connecticut anti-discrimination law than the more restrictive interpretations found in
earlier cases." Declaratory Ruling, supra note 10, at 19-20. A Massachusetts Superior
Court recently found that a transgender student could bring a sex discrimination claim
against a school that imposed a sex-specific clothing requirement. See Doe v. Yunits, et.
al., No. 00-1060-A, slip op. at 1 (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 11, 2000), affd sub nom, Doe v.
Brockton Sch. Comm., No. 2000-J-638, slip op. (Mass. App. Ct. Nov. 30, 2000). The
school admitted that it would allow girls, but not boys, to wear skirts or dresses. Id.
132. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 256.
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she is treated adversely because the defendant prefers people to
look "stereotypically masculine" or "stereotypically feminine."
C. Sex Discrimination Prohibitions Extend to Cover Trans
People Under State Law
In recent cases decided under state and federal laws
prohibiting sex discrimination, courts have recognized
discrimination against transgender people as sex discrimination.
This emerging body of law rejects the Orwellian notion that
there is a meaningful legal distinction between discrimination
because of sex and discrimination because of a change of sex.
133
As one Southern District of New York Court explained:
[Alithough the state antidiscrimination statute is similar to
Title VII, New York courts are not bound by interpretations
of the federal law and... the overriding remedial purpose of
the state statute "was by blanket description to eliminate all
forms of discrimination, those then existing as well as any
later devised." 134
The Rentos court held that post-operative transsexuals were
protected from sex discrimination and harassment under New
York State and New York City human rights laws. 135 The court
denied the defendant's motion to strike the plaintiff's complaint
for failure to provide a more definite statement of her claim
because the court found that the plaintiff adequately identified
her protected class status as a "transgender female."136
In Maffei v. Kolaeton Industry, Inc.,13 7 the plaintiff, Daniel
Maffei (born Diane), was considered an exemplary employee who
"executed his duties in a stellar fashion, was frequently praised
133. See Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 664 (9th Cir. 1977)
(holding that Title VII does not proscribe discrimination due to a change of sex).
Although some courts have relied on that purported distinction to justify excluding
transgender plaintiffs from protection under sex discrimination laws, it seems doubtful
that any court would accept such a distinction as valid in an analogous civil rights
context. It is improbable, for example, that a court deciding a case in which an employee
was fired for converting from one religious faith to another would dismiss the case on the
ground that the employee had failed to state a claim for discrimination on the basis of
religion.
134. Rentos v. OCE-Office Sys., No. 95 Civ. 7908LAP, 1996 WL 737215, at *8
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 24, 1996) (quoting Maffei v. Kolaeton Indus., Inc., 626 N.Y.S.2d 391 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1995)).
135. Id. at *9.
136. Id.
137. 626 N.Y.S.2d 391 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995).
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about his work performance, and received salary increases and
bonuses on a consistent basis" 138 until he underwent sex re-
assignment surgery. After Daniel had undergone some
surgery, 139 the president of Kolaeton degraded him, ostracized
him from other employees and berated Daniel for being im-
moral. 140 Finding that such harassment was impermissible sex
discrimination, the court explained that "derogatory comments
relating to the fact that as a result of an operation an employee
changed his or her sexual status, creates discrimination based on
'sex."141 The Connecticut Commission on Human Rights and
Opportunities also recently issued a declaratory ruling
consistent with this trend. 142
D. Growing Trend in International Law Is to Recognize Claims
Brought by Transgender People as Sex Discrimination.
The legal analysis applied in Maffei and Rentos is similar to
that applied in a recent European Court of Justice (ECJ)
decision, P. v. S. & Cornwall County Council,143 which held that
discrimination against a transgender person who transitioned in
the workplace was discrimination on the basis of sex.144 In that
decision, the ECJ concluded that a person is the subject of
disparate treatment when "he or she is treated unfavourably by
comparison with persons of the sex to which he or she was
deemed to belong before undergoing gender reassignment."1 45 As
a practical matter, this seems obvious in a case, like Maffei,
138. Id. at 392.
139. The court noted that the record was not clear on what physical changes had
taken place and to what extent Daniel had "completed his metamorphosis." Id. at 391.
Nothing in the outcome of the case turned on whether Daniel had undergone complete,
partial, or any surgery, for that matter. Id.
140. Id. at 392.
141. Id. at 396.
142. See generally Declaratory Ruling, supra note 10 (stating that tranagender people
are covered by the state's law prohibiting sex discrimination).
143. Case C-13/94, P. v. S. & Corwall County Council, 1996 E.C.R. 1-2159, [1996] 2
C.M.L.R. 247, 263 (1996) (P's employer issued a three month dismissal notice when P
was pre-operative, which took effect after P's sex reassignment was complete).
144. Id.
145. Id. at 1-2165. In P. v. S., the ECJ determined that the Equal Treatment Directive
(Directive) includes transgender persons. Article (1) of the Directive provides in relevant
part: "ITihe purpose of the directive is to put into effect in the Member States the prin-
ciple of equal treatment for men and women... as regards access to employment...."
Id. at 1-2162. Article 5(1) of the Directive provides: "Application of the principle of equal
treatment with regard to 'working conditions, including the conditions governing
dismissal, means that men and women shall be guaranteed the same conditions without
discrimination on grounds of sex." Id. at 1-2163.
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where an otherwise exemplary employee faces discrimination
only when others in the workplace learn that he/she is
transgender. This approach has recently been endorsed by a
Canadian tribunal, which held that "it is not clear how
discrimination based on transsexualism or on the process of
transsexualism could be anything other than sex-based." 146
E. As a Factual Matter, Most Instances of Discrimination
Against Transgender People Can Be Fairly Characterized as Sex-
Based
In order to more fully understand why discrimination
against transgender people is properly characterized as sex
discrimination, it is helpful to consider examples of situations
involving discrimination against transgender persons. Although
each fact scenario is slightly different, each can be understood as
sex discrimination when broken down to the factual elements
that form the basis of the different treatment.
These examples are illustrative rather than exhaustive. As
with any other form of discrimination, discrimination against
transgender people can and does take a wide variety of forms.
These examples do not intend to provide a rigid or definitive
taxonomy or to suggest that there is any one "right" way to
analyze the facts in a particular case. Rather, the point is to
describe a few common scenarios in which discrimination
against transgender people takes place and to show how those
scenarios can (1) be analyzed under established principles of sex
discrimination law and (2) be brought as early cases consistent
with the Houston model proposed here. These examples attempt
to provide sample scenarios outside the "hot button" areas
identified in Section III.
For example, consider a regular customer at a hair salon (a
biological male) who after putting off regular hair appointments
for several months returns as a female. If the barber refuses to
provide hair-cutting services for this regular customer because
the customer transitioned from male to female, that barber has
engaged in sex discrimination. 147 Perhaps the clearest way to
see sex as the basis for the discriminatory treatment is that but
146. See Commission Des Droits De La Personne Et Des Droits De La Jeunesse v.
Maison des Jeunes, Canada Province of Quebec, Human Rights Tribunal File No. 500-53-
00078-970, at 21.
147. Such a case would have to be brought under a state anti-discrimination law
prohibiting sex discrimination in public accommodations or the provision of goods and
services. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, §§ 92A, 98 (West 1990).
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for the new sex of the customer, the business owner would not
have taken any adverse action against the customer.. If the only
reason the barber is now refusing to serve the customer is
because of a changed sex, the discriminatory treatment is
prohibited because it is on the basis of sex.
A second example involves a transgender employee who had
undergone sex reassignment from female to male before he was
hired. Assume that at the time he is hired, neither the employer
nor any co-workers are aware that he is transgender. If it is
disclosed publicly that the employee was female at birth and he
becomes the subject of adverse treatment or harassment in the
workplace because it is learned that he is a transgender man,
the root of the discrimination is that he was born female. In
other words, the transgender discrimination experienced by the
employee is sex discrimination based on the sex that he was
born. The sex ascribed to him at birth is being used to limit his
current actions and choices. Using the test from the last
example, but for the birth sex of the employee the adverse action
would not have occurred. For example, if he had been born male
he would not have been subjected to the adverse treatment.
As a final example, consider again a customer in a public
accommodation who informs a proprietor that she is a
transgender person and will be transitioning from male-to-
female. Assume that the proprietor has a negative response and
refuses to serve the customer because the proprietor is offended
by or uncomfortable with the idea of a man changing his sex to
become a woman. In refusing to serve the customer on that
basis, the proprietor has engaged in sex discrimination because
the transgender customer is being singled out for adverse
treatment on the basis of the proprietor's attitudes and beliefs
about men, in particular, the proprietor's belief that a man
should not alter his biological sex. Although the owner may
attempt to articulate some basis, apart from those related to sex,
to create a separate and distinct anti-trans animus, it is difficult
in the extreme to logically understand these explanations as
anything other than normative beliefs about the nature of men
and women. Although the owner may believe that he is not
motivated by sex discrimination, but by a moral imperative to
preserve a perceived natural order of sex, in reality these
justifications are indistinct. While the owner's irrational fear
may derive from unfounded assumptions widely taught, his
actions are still prohibited. Disparate treatment justified by
normative beliefs about sex can only be understood legally as
[Vol. 7:5
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discrimination on account of sex, and, therefore, may not survive
challenge.
V. A CASE STUDY
With the building blocks already in place, the key to
securing trans rights may be the selection of proper plaintiffs. In
light of this Article's counsel to avoid bathroom1 48 and some
employment cases until more can be done to educate courts and
the public at large, a recommended case scenario is
demonstrated by an Equal Credit Opportunity Act 149 case filed
in 1998 in the District of Massachusetts. 1-° In Rosa v. Park West
Bank & Trust Co.,151 the plaintiff, a biological male who looks
like a woman and lives as a woman, went into a bank to request
a loan application.15 2  A loan officer asked her 153 to produce
photo identification. 5 4 Rosa gave the loan officer three pieces of
identification containing her photograph. 155  In one photograph
Rosa appeared traditionally masculine, in one she appeared
traditionally feminine and in one she appeared gender
ambiguous. 156 The loan officer responded with disgust and
would not help her until she "went home and changed"157 to look
more like the identification card in which she appeared
traditionally masculine. 158
148. It bears mention that in a recent important victory, a Minnesota appeals court
recently affirmed that a transgender (male-to-female) employee prohibited from using
the women's restroom established a case of sexual orientation discrimination. Goins v.
West Group, 619 N.W.2d 424, 428-29 (2000). Unlike the other states with sexual
orientation non-discrimination laws, Minnesota defines sexual orientation to include
"having or being perceived as having a self-image or identity not traditionally associated
with one's biological maleness or femaleness," thereby including transgender people
within its purview. Id at 428.
149. 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (1994).
150. For purposes of full disclosure, the author represents that she was counsel of
record in the case along with GLAD's Civil Rights Director, Mary Bonauto.
151. 214 F.3d 213 (1st Cir. 2000).
152. Id. at 214.
153. The plaintiff in the case is biologically male but self-identifies as female. In order
to minimize confusion for the court, the plaintiff is referred to in court documents as "he"
or "him." Out of respect for the plaintiff's self-identity, Rosa is herein referred to as "she"
or "her." The recent practice of most courts is to respect the self-identity of litigants. See,
e.g., Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1192 n.1 (9th Cir. 2000); Meriwether v.
Faulkner, 821 F.2d 408, 409 n. 1 (7th Cir. 1987); Smith v. Rasmussen, 57 F. Supp. 2d 736,
740 n.2 (N.D. Iowa 1999).
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Rosa filed a complaint against the bank under both state
and federal law.159 The relevant state claim was for sex
discrimination in a public accommodation 160 and in lending. The
federal claim was brought under the Equal Credit Opportunity
Act which has been construed consistently with the federal
employment non-discrimination laws (Title VII). 16 1 By avoiding
bathrooms and "men in dresses" in the workplace, this case
provided a good test of the hypothesis advanced by this Article.
Moreover, to the extent that sex-specific dress codes hbve been
upheld based on "legitimate business needs," those cases could
not be used here by the bank. There is no legitimate business
justification for requiring a bank customer to wear sex-specific
clothing. 162 Nor could the bank proffer any economic justification
for a sex-specific clothing requirement. To the contrary, all of
the economic rationalizations support allowing customers to
wear whatever clothing they want. 163
The difficulty the district court had with the case early on
illustrates what an uphill battle it may be to secure trans rights.
Perhaps largely because normative beliefs about sex are so
firmly held, the district judge dismissed this case on a Rule
12(b)(6) 164 motion for failure to state a claim. In the words of the
judge, "[diespite Rosa's strenuous argument to the contrary, the
issue in this case is not his sex, but rather how he chose to dress
when applying for a loan."165 Going farther, the court found
Rosa's reliance on Price Waterhouse misguided, saying that that
159. Id.
160. Massachusetts' public accommodation law prohibits discrimination on the basis of
sex and sexual orientation. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, §§ 92A, 98 (West 1990).
Federal public accommodations law prohibits only race discrimination, not sex
discrimination, in such circumstances. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1994).
161. See Equal Employment Opportunity Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994 & Supp. IV
1998); Mercado-Garcia v. Ponce Fed. Bank, 979 F.2d 890, 893 (1st Cir. 1992) (applying
interpretive standards of EEOA to an ECOA claim for age discrimination in lending). But
see Latimore v. Citibank Fed. Say. Bank, 151 F.3d 712, 713-14 (7th Cir. 1998)
(distinguishing plaintiffs claim for race discrimination in lending under ECOA from
EEOA employment discrimination cases).
162. Although a bank might plausibly offer a customer preference justification, such
justifications have been rejected in the race context and it is extremely doubtful that a
court would accept it in the context of sex. See, e.g., Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways,
Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 389 (5th Cir. 1971) (rejecting customer preference for female flight
attendants as justification for sex discrimination).
163. Nor could the bank justify its request by arguing it could not properly identify the
applicant from the photographs presented. If the loan officer could not identify R~sa, the
request would reasonably have been for additional corroborating documentation, not to
go home and change. Rosa, 214 F.3d at 214.
164. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
165. Rosa v. Park W. Bank & Trust Co., Civ. Action No. 99-30085-FHF, slip op. at 1
(D. Mass. Oct. 16, 1998), rev'd, 214 F.3d 213 (1st Cir. 2000).
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case does not prohibit a lender "from requesting someone to
change their clothes, and it does not render denying someone
consumer services or employment based upon their dress illegal
discrimination."166 Perhaps forgetting that sex discrimination
law clearly covers men and women, 167 the judge concluded by
saying, "[slimply put, neither a man nor a woman can change
their status from unprotected to protected simply by changing
his or her clothing."168
This case is informative with respect to developing a long-
term strategy for securing trans rights. The judge's apparent
resolution of "the issue in this case,"169  without even
acknowledging it as such, demonstrates how firmly held
normative beliefs are about sex. The way in which the judge
dismissed this case parallels the dismissive way courts have
addressed discriminatory dress codes in recent times. 170 Missing
the point about Price Waterhouse, the court failed to understand
that the loan officer's refusal was based on the applicant's sex,
despite the allegation that the refusal was because the applicant
was a man who failed to look like one.171
On appeal, the United State Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit reversed. 172 The court summarily dismissed the bank's
argument that federal anti-discrimination law cannot apply to a
plaintiff that the defendant characterized as a "crossdresser." 173
Moreover, the court found that:
[I]t is reasonable to infer that [the loan officer] told Rosa to go
home and change because she thought that Rosa's attire did
not accord with his male gender: in other words, that Rosa
did not receive the loan application because he was a man,
whereas a similarly situated woman would have received the
loan application. That is, the Bank may treat, for credit
166. Id.
167, See, e.g., Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serve., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 78 (1998) (citing
Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 682 (1983)).
168. Rosa, Civ. Action No. 99-30085.FHF, at 2.
169. Id. at 1.
170. Whisner, supra note 92, at 75.
171. Rosa, Civ. Action No. 99-30085-FHF, at 2; see also Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d
1187, 1199-1203 (9th Cir. 2000) (failing to conform to gender expectations is
impermissible sex discrimination); Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc. 194 F.3d
252, 261 n.4 (1st Cir. 1999) (noting that failure to conform to gender expectations violates
Title VII).
172. Rosa v. Park W. Bank & Trust Co., 214 F.3d 213, 216 (lst Cir. 2000).
173. Id.
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purposes, a woman who dresses like a man differently than a
man who dresses like a woman. 174
In short, the court found that the facts in Rosa constituted a
claim of sex discrimination. 175
The remarkable thing about Rosa is that a federal appellate
court recognized two theories that earlier courts had rejected in
previous cases with analogous facts, arguably because these
earlier cases raised the specter of unisex bathrooms or "men in
dresses." First, if an individual would not have been treated
adversely but for his/her sex, such facts constitute a claim of sex
discrimination. 176 In addition, the First Circuit applied the
reasoning of Price Waterhouse, finding that, if a plaintiff, can
show that the basis for the adverse treatment was sex
stereotyping, that supports a sex discrimination claim.177 That
these very basic theories of sex discrimination could be seen in a
case involving credit and public accommodations suggests that it
is not the legal theories that are hard to grasp, but that they
pertain regardless of the factual circumstances in which they are
presented.
VI. CONCLUSION
The tide is clearly turning since the low point in the 1970s
when transgender people were completely excluded from the
protections of civil rights laws. Numerous jurisdictions have
explicitly expanded the scope of their laws' protections to ensure
that transgender people are protected against discrimination. 178
In addition, the earlier case law that created the exclusion has
been overruled and newer high court decisions 179 have made it
clear that transgender people may seek redress under existing
law. Despite this dramatic shift in the legal landscape, not all
courts, and clearly not all defendants, understand that existing
sex discrimination laws also cover transgender people.
As Charles Hamilton Houston understood, sometimes
having the law on one's side is not enough. Reversing a historic
174. Id. at 215-16.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 215.
177. Id. at 216.
178. See CURRAH & MINTER, supra note 10, at 38-50. Over twenty-five local
jurisdictions have ordinances or orders that prohibit discrimination against transgender
people. Id.
179. E.g., Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998); Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
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exclusion from civil rights law requires a well thought out
strategy that includes coordinated education and legislative
components. Bringing a range of cases on behalf of transgender
people, focusing on those that avoid some of the strong, deep-
seated and pervasive ideas held by gender binarists, is a critical
first step toward securing trans rights. Paving the way to this
much needed expansion of civil rights to protect transgender
people will in turn allow law to function as it is meant to-
through principled applications of statutes-rather than through
irrational, emotional expression of judges' bias.
